Michel Foucault. Of Other Spaces (1967), Heterotopias.
This text, entitled "Des Espace Autres," and published by the
French journal Architecture /Mouvement/ Continuité in October, 1984, was the basis
of a lecture given by Michel Foucault in March 1967. Although not reviewed for
publication by the author and thus not part of the official corpus of his work,
the manuscript was released into the public domain for an exhibition in Berlin
shortly before Michel Foucault's death. Translated from the
French by Jay Miskowiec.
The great obsession of the nineteenth century was, as we know, history:
with its themes of development and of suspension, of crisis, and cycle, themes
of the ever-accumulating past, with its great preponderance of dead men and the
menacing glaciation of the world. The nineteenth century found its essential
mythological resources in the second principle of thermaldynamics- The present
epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space. We are in the epoch of
simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and
far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed. We are at a moment. I believe, when
our experience of the world is less that of a long life developing through time
than that of a network that connects points and intersects with its own skein.
One could perhaps say that certain ideological conflicts animating present-day
polemics oppose the pious descendents of time and the determined inhabitants of
space. Structuralism, or at least which is grouped under this slightly too
general name, is the effort to establish, between elements that could have been
connected on a temporal axis, an ensemble of relations that makes them appear
as juxtaposed, set off against one another, implicated by each other-that makes
them appear, in short, as a sort of configuration. Actually, structuralism does
not entail denial of time; it does involve a certain manner of dealing with
what we call time and what we call history.
Yet it is necessary to notice that the space which today appears to form
the horizon of our concerns, our theory, our systems, is not an innovation;
space itself has a history in Western experience, and it is not possible to
disregard the fatal intersection of time with space. One could say, by way of
retracing this history of space very roughly, that in the Middle Ages there was
a hierarchic ensemble of places: sacred places and profane plates: protected
places and open, exposed places: urban places and rural places (all these
concern the real life of men). In cosmological theory, there were the
supercelestial places as opposed to the celestial, and the celestial place was
in its turn opposed to the terrestrial place. There were places where things
had been put because they had been violently displaced, and then on the
contrary places where things found their natural ground and stability. It was
this complete hierarchy, this opposition, this intersection of places that
constituted what could very roughly be called medieval space: the space of
emplacement.
This space of emplacement was opened up by Galileo. For the real scandal of
Galileo's work lay not so much in his discovery, or rediscovery, that the earth
revolved around the sun, but in his constitution of an infinite, and infinitely
open space. In such a space the place of the Middle Ages turned out to be
dissolved. as it were; a thing's place was no longer
anything but a point in its movement, just as the stability of a thing was only
its movement indefinitely slowed down. In other words, starting with Galileo
and the seventeenth century, extension was substituted for localization.
Today the site has been substituted for extension which itself had replaced
emplacement. The site is defined by relations of proximity between points or
elements; formally, we can describe these relations as series, trees, or grids.
Moreover, the importance of the site as a problem in contemporary technical
work is well known: the storage of data or of the intermediate results of a
calculation in the memory of a machine, the circulation of discrete elements
with a random output (automobile traffic is a simple case, or indeed the sounds
on a telephone line); the identification of marked or coded elements inside a
set that may be randomly distributed, or may be arranged according to single or
to multiple classifications.
In a still more concrete manner, the problem of siting or placement arises
for mankind in terms of demography. This problem of the human site or living
space is not simply that of knowing whether there will be enough space for men
in the world -a problem that is certainly quite important - but also that of
knowing what relations of propinquity, what type of storage, circulation,
marking, and classification of human elements should be adopted in a given
situation in order to achieve a given end. Our epoch is one in which space
takes for us the form of relations among sites.
In any case I believe that the anxiety of our era has to do fundamentally
with space, no doubt a great deal more than with time. Time probably appears to
us only as one of the various distributive operations that are possible for the
elements that are spread out in space,
Now, despite all the techniques for appropriating space, despite the whole
network of knowledge that enables us to delimit or to formalize it,
contemporary space is perhaps still not entirely desanctified (apparently
unlike time, it would seem, which was detached from
the sacred in the nineteenth century). To be sure a certain theoretical desanctification of
space (the one signaled by Galileo's work) has occurred, but we may still not
have reached the point of a practical desanctification of space. And perhaps
our life is still governed by a certain number of oppositions that remain
inviolable, that our institutions and practices have not yet dared to break
down. These are oppositions that we regard as simple givens: for example
between private space and public space, between family space and social space,
between cultural space and useful space, between the space of leisure and that
of work. All these are still nurtured by the hidden presence of the sacred.
Bachelard's
monumental work and the descriptions of phenomenologists have taught us that we
do not live in a homogeneous and empty space, but on the contrary in a space
thoroughly imbued with quantities and perhaps thoroughly fantasmatic as well.
The space of our primary perception, the space of our dreams and that of our
passions hold within themselves qualities that seem intrinsic: there is a
light, ethereal, transparent space, or again a dark, rough, encumbered space; a
space from above, of summits, or on the contrary a space from below of mud; or
again a space that can be flowing like sparkling water, or space that is fixed,
congealed, like stone or crystal. Yet these analyses, while fundamental for
reflection in our time, primarily concern internal space. I should like to
speak now of external space.
The space in
which we live, which draws us out of ourselves, in which the erosion of our
lives. our time and our history occurs, the space that
claws and gnaws at us, is also, in itself, a heterogeneous space. In other
words, we do not live in a kind of void, inside of which we could place
individuals and things. We do not live inside a void that could be colored with
diverse shades of light, we live inside a set of relations that delineates
sites which are irreducible to one another and absolutely not superimposable on
one another.
Of course
one might attempt to describe these different sites by looking for the set of
relations by which a given site can be defined. For example, describing the set
of relations that define the sites of transportation, streets, trains (a train
is an extraordinary bundle of relations because it is something through which
one goes, it is also something by means of which one can go from one point to
another, and then it is also something that goes by). One could describe, via
the cluster of relations that allows them to be defined, the sites of temporary
relaxation -cafes, cinemas, beaches. Likewise one could describe, via its
network of relations, the closed or semi-closed sites of rest - the house, the
bedroom, the bed, el cetera. But among all these sites, I am interested in
certain ones that have the curious property of being in relation with all the
other sites, but in such a way as to suspect, neutralize, or invent the set of
relations that they happen to designate, mirror, or reflect. These spaces, as
it were, which are linked with all the others, which however contradict all the
other sites, are of two main types.
HETEROTOPIAS
First there
are the utopias. Utopias are sites with no real place. They are sites that have
a general relation of direct or inverted analogy with the real space of
Society. They present society itself in a perfected form, or else society
turned upside down, but in any case these utopias are fundamentally unreal
spaces.
There are
also, probably in every culture, in every civilization, real places - places
that do exist and that are formed in the very founding of society - which are
something like counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the
real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are
simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted. Places of this kind are
outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their
location in reality. Because these places are absolutely different from all the
sites that they reflect and speak about, I shall call them, by way of contrast to
utopias, heterotopias. I believe that between utopias and these quite other
sites, these heterotopias, there might be a sort of mixed, joint experience,
which would be the mirror. The mirror is, after all, a utopia, since it is a
placeless place. In the mirror, I see myself there where I am not, in an
unreal, virtual space that opens up behind the surface; I am over there, there
where I am not, a sort of shadow that gives my own visibility to myself, that
enables me to see myself there where I am absent: such is the utopia of the
mirror. But it is also a heterotopia in so far as the mirror does exist in
reality, where it exerts a sort of counteraction on the position that I occupy.
From the standpoint of the mirror I discover my absence from the place where I
am since I see myself over there. Starting from this gaze that is, as it were,
directed toward me, from the ground of this virtual space that is on the other
side of the glass, I come back toward myself; I begin again to direct my eyes
toward myself and to reconstitute myself there where I am. The mirror functions
as a heterotopia in this respect: it makes this place that I occupy at the
moment when I look at myself in the glass at once absolutely real, connected
with all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal, since in order to
be perceived it has to pass through this virtual point which is over there.
As for the heterotopias as such, how can they be described?
What meaning do they have? We might imagine a sort of systematic description - I
do not say a science because the term is too galvanized now -that would, in a
given society, take as its object the study, analysis, description, and
'reading' (as some like to say nowadays) of these different spaces, of these
other places. As a sort of simultaneously mythic and real contestation of the
space in which we live, this description could be called heterotopology.
Its first
principle is that
there is probably not a single culture in the world that fails to constitute
heterotopias. That is a constant of every human group. But the heterotopias
obviously take quite varied forms, and perhaps no one absolutely universal form
of heterotopia would be found. We can however class them in two main
categories.
In the
so-called primitive societies, there is a certain form of heterotopia that I
would call crisis heterotopias, i.e., there are privileged or sacred or
forbidden places, reserved for individuals who are, in relation to society and
to the human environment in which they live, in a state of crisis: adolescents,
menstruating women, pregnant women. the elderly, etc.
In out society, these crisis heterotopias are persistently disappearing, though
a few remnants can still be found. For example, the boarding school, in its
nineteenth-century form, or military service for young men, have certainly
played such a role, as the first manifestations of sexual virility were in fact
supposed to take place "elsewhere" than at home. For girls, there
was, until the middle of the twentieth century, a tradition called the
"honeymoon trip" which was an ancestral theme. The young woman's
deflowering could take place "nowhere" and, at the moment of its
occurrence the train or honeymoon hotel was indeed the place of this nowhere,
this heterotopia without geographical markers.
But these
heterotopias of crisis are disappearing today and are being replaced, I
believe, by what we might call heterotopias of deviation: those in which
individuals whose behavior is deviant in relation to the required mean or norm
are placed. Cases of this are rest homes and psychiatric hospitals, and of
course prisons, and one should perhaps add retirement homes that are, as it
were, on the borderline between the heterotopia of crisis and the heterotopia
of deviation since, after all, old age is a crisis, but is also a deviation
since in our society where leisure is the rule, idleness is a sort of
deviation.
The second
principle of this
description of heterotopias is that a society, as its history unfolds, can make
an existing heterotopia function in a very different fashion; for each
heterotopia has a precise and determined function within a society and the same
heterotopia can, according to the synchrony of the culture in which it occurs,
have one function or another.
As an
example I shall take the strange heterotopia of the cemetery. The cemetery is
certainly a place unlike ordinary cultural spaces. It is a space that is
however connected with all the sites of the city, state or society or village,
etc., since each individual, each family has relatives in the cemetery. In
western culture the cemetery has practically always existed. But it has
undergone important changes. Until the end of the eighteenth century, the
cemetery was placed at the heart of the city, next to the church. In it there
was a hierarchy of possible tombs. There was the charnel house in which bodies
lost the last traces of individuality, there were a few individual tombs and
then there were the tombs inside the church. These latter tombs were themselves
of two types, either simply tombstones with an inscription, or mausoleums with
statues. This cemetery housed inside the sacred space of the church has taken
on a quite different cast in modern civilizations, and curiously, it is in a
time when civilization has become 'atheistic,' as one says very crudely, that
western culture has established what is termed the cult of the dead.
Basically it
was quite natural that, in a time of real belief in the resurrection of bodies
and the immortality of the soul, overriding importance was not accorded to the
body's remains. On the contrary, from the moment when people are no longer sure
that they have a soul or that the body will regain life, it is perhaps
necessary to give much more attention to the dead body, which is ultimately the
only trace of our existence in the world and in language. In any case, it is
from the beginning of the nineteenth century that everyone has a right to her
or his own little box for her or his own little personal decay, but on the
other hand, it is only from that start of the nineteenth century that
cemeteries began to be located at the outside border of cities. In correlation
with the individualization of death and the bourgeois appropriation of the
cemetery, there arises an obsession with death as an 'illness.' The dead, it is
supposed, bring illnesses to the living, and it is the presence and proximity
of the dead right beside the houses, next to the church, almost in the middle
of the street, it is this proximity that propagates death itself. This major
theme of illness spread by the contagion in the cemeteries persisted until the
end of the eighteenth century, until, during the nineteenth century, the shift
of cemeteries toward the suburbs was initiated. The cemeteries then came to
constitute, no longer the sacred and immortal heart of the city, but the other
city, where each family possesses its dark resting place.
Third
principle. The
heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several
sites that are in themselves incompatible. Thus it is that the theater brings
onto the rectangle of the stage, one after the other, a whole series of places
that are foreign to one another; thus it is that the cinema is a very odd
rectangular room, at the end of which, on a two-dimensional screen, one sees
the projection of a three-dimensional space, but perhaps the oldest example of
these heterotopias that take the form of contradictory sites is the garden. We
must not forget that in the Orient the garden, an astonishing creation that is
now a thousand years old, had very deep and seemingly superimposed meanings.
The traditional garden of the Persians was a sacred space that was supposed to
bring together inside its rectangle four parts representing the four parts of
the world, with a space still more sacred than the others that were like an
umbilicus, the navel of the world at its center (the basin and water fountain
were there); and all the vegetation of the garden was supposed to come together
in this space, in this sort of microcosm. As for carpets, they were originally
reproductions of gardens (the garden is a rug onto which the whole world comes
to enact its symbolic perfection, and the rug is a sort of garden that can move
across space). The garden is the smallest parcel of the world and then it is
the totality of the world. The garden has been a sort of happy, universalizing
heterotopia since the beginnings of antiquity (our modern zoological gardens
spring from that source).
Fourth
principle.
Heterotopias are most often linked to slices in time - which is to say that
they open onto what might be termed, for the sake of symmetry, heterochronies.
The heterotopia begins to function at full capacity when men arrive at a sort
of absolute break with their traditional time. This situation shows us that the
cemetery is indeed a highly heterotopic place since, for the individual, the
cemetery begins with this strange heterochrony, the loss of life, and with this
quasi-eternity in which her permanent lot is dissolution and disappearance.
From a
general standpoint, in a society like ours heterotopias and heterochronies are
structured and distributed in a relatively complex fashion. First of all, there
are heterotopias of indefinitely accumulating time, for example museums and
libraries, Museums and libraries have become heterotopias in which time never
stops building up and topping its own summit, whereas in the seventeenth
century, even at the end of the century, museums and libraries were the
expression of an individual choice. By contrast, the idea of accumulating
everything, of establishing a sort of general archive, the will to enclose in
one place all times, all epochs, all forms, all tastes, the idea of
constituting a place of all times that is itself outside of time and
inaccessible to its ravages, the project of organizing in this way a sort of
perpetual and indefinite accumulation of time in an immobile place, this whole
idea belongs to our modernity. The museum and the library are heterotopias that
are proper to western culture of the nineteenth century.
Opposite
these heterotopias that are linked to the accumulation of time, there are those
linked, on the contrary, to time in its most flowing, transitory, precarious
aspect, to time in the mode of the festival. These heterotopias are not
oriented toward the eternal, they are rather absolutely temporal [chroniques].
Such, for example, are the fairgrounds, these' marvelous empty sites on the
outskirts of cities that teem once or twice a year with stands, displays,
heteroclite objects, wrestlers, snakewomen, fortune-tellers, and so forth.
Quite recently, a new kind of temporal heterotopia has been invented: vacation
villages, such as those Polynesian villages that offer a compact three weeks of
primitive and eternal nudity to the inhabitants of the cities. You see,
moreover, that through the two forms of heterotopias that come together here,
the heterotopia of the festival and that of the eternity of accumulating time,
the huts of Djerba are in a sense relatives of libraries and museums. for the rediscovery of Polynesian life abolishes time; yet
the experience is just as much the,, rediscovery of time, it is as if the
entire history of humanity reaching back to its origin were accessible in a
sort of immediate knowledge,
Fifth
principle.
Heterotopias always presuppose a system of opening and closing that both
isolates them and makes them penetrable. In general, the heterotopic site is
not freely accessible like a public place. Either the entry is compulsory, as
in the case of entering a barracks or a prison, or else the individual has to
submit to rites and purifications. To get in one must have a certain permission
and make certain gestures. Moreover, there are even heterotopias that are
entirely consecrated to these activities of purification -purification that is
partly religious and partly hygienic, such as the hammin of the Moslems, or
else purification that appears to be purely hygienic, as in Scandinavian
saunas.
There are
others, on the contrary, that seem to be pure and simple openings, but that
generally hide curious exclusions. Everyone can enter into thew heterotopic
sites, but in fact that is only an illusion- we think we enter where we are, by
the very fact that we enter, excluded. I am thinking for example, of the famous
bedrooms that existed on the great farms of Brazil and elsewhere in South
America. The entry door did not lead into the central room where the family
lived, and every individual or traveler who came by had the right to ope this
door, to enter into the bedroom and to sleep there for a night. Now these
bedrooms were such that the individual who went into them never had access to
the family's quarter the visitor was absolutely the guest in transit, was not
really the invited guest. This type of heterotopia, which has practically
disappeared from our civilizations, could perhaps be found in the famous
American motel rooms where a man goes with his car and his mistress and where
illicit sex is both absolutely sheltered and absolutely hidden, kept isolated
without however being allowed out in the open.
Sixth
principle. The last
trait of heterotopias is that they have a function in relation to all the space
that remains. This function unfolds between two extreme poles. Either their role
is to create a space of illusion that exposes every real space, all the sites
inside of which human life is partitioned, as still more illusory (perhaps that
is the role that was played by those famous brothels of which we are now
deprived). Or else, on the contrary, their role is to create a space that is
other, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as ours
is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled. This latter type would be the
heterotopia, not of illusion, but of compensation, and I wonder if certain
colonies have not functioned somewhat in this manner. In certain cases, they
have played, on the level of the general organization of terrestrial space, the
role of heterotopias. I am thinking, for example, of the first wave of colonization
in the seventeenth century, of the Puritan societies that the English had
founded in America and that were absolutely perfect other places. I am also
thinking of those extraordinary Jesuit colonies that were founded in South
America: marvelous, absolutely regulated colonies in which human perfection was
effectively achieved. The Jesuits of Paraguay established colonies in which
existence was regulated at every turn. The village was laid out according to a
rigorous plan around a rectangular place at the foot of which was the church;
on one side, there was the school; on the other, the cemetery-, and then, in
front of the church, an avenue set out that another crossed at fight angles;
each family had its little cabin along these two axes and thus the sign of
Christ was exactly reproduced. Christianity marked the space and geography of
the American world with its fundamental sign.
The daily
life of individuals was regulated, not by the whistle, but by the bell.
Everyone was awakened at the same time, everyone began work at the same time;
meals were at noon and five o'clock-, then came bedtime, and at midnight came
what was called the marital wake-up, that is, at the chime of the churchbell,
each person carried out her/his duty.
Brothels and
colonies are two extreme types of heterotopia, and if we think, after all, that
the boat is a floating piece of space, a place without a place, that exists by
itself, that is closed in on itself and at the same time is given over to the
infinity of the sea and that, from port to port, from tack to tack, from
brothel to brothel, it goes as far as the colonies in search of the most
precious treasures they conceal in their gardens, you will understand why the
boat has not only been for our civilization, from the sixteenth century until
the present, the great instrument of economic development (I have not been
speaking of that today), but has been simultaneously the greatest reserve of
the imagination. The ship is the heterotopia par excellence. In civilizations
without boats, dreams dry up, espionage takes the place of adventure, and the
police take the place of pirates.
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