by Nikhil Padgaonkar
N.P.: Let me
begin this interview by asking you what has been retained today from the word
"philosophy" as the Greeks understood it nearly three thousand years
ago - that is, as love of wisdom. Are either "love" or "wisdom"
issues today?
J.D.: Well,
when we teach philosophy in
N.P.: Over
the years, you have repeatedly defended the view that deconstruction is not an
inherently negative term, that it is not to be
understood as criticism or destruction. And indeed in an interview you gave in
1982 and which was subsequently published in Le Monde,
you even said that deconstruction is always accompanied by love. Could you
comment on this "love". Is it the same love
as in "philia"?
J.D.: This
love means an affirmative desire towards the Other -
to respect the Other, to pay attention to the Other, not to destroy the
otherness of the Other - and this is the preliminary affirmation, even if
afterwards because of this love, you ask questions. There is some negativity in
deconstruction. I wouldn't deny this. You have to criticise, to ask questions,
to challenge and sometimes to oppose. What I have said is that in the final
instance, deconstruction is not negative although negativity is no doubt at
work. Now, in order to criticise, to negate, to deny, you have first to say
"yes". When you address the Other, even if
it is to oppose the Other, you make a sort of promise - that is, to address the
Other as Other, not to reduce the otherness of the Other, and to take into
account the singularity of the Other. That's an irreducible affirmation, its the original ethics if you want. So from that point of
view, there is an ethics of deconstruction. Not in the usual sense, but there
is an affirmation. You know, I often use a quote from Rosensweig
or even from Levinas which says that the
"yes" is not a word like others, that even if you do not pronounce
the word, there is a "yes" implicit in every language, even if you
multiply the "no", there is a "yes". And this is even the
case with Heidegger. You know Heidegger, for a long time, for years and years kept
saying that thinking started with questioning, that questioning (fragen) is the dignity of thinking. And then one day,
without contradicting this statement, he said "yes, but there is something
even more originary than questioning, than this piety
of thinking," and it is what he called zusage
which means to acquiesce, to accept, to say "yes", to affirm. So this
zusage is not only prior to questioning, but it is
supposed by any questioning. To ask a question, you must first tell the Other that I am speaking to you. Even to oppose or challenge
the Other, you must say "at least I speak to
you", "I say yes to our being in common together". So this is
what I meant by love, this reaffirmation of the affirmation.
N.P.: To many of your readers, one of the important consequences
of reading your works is the realization that criticism from an
"outside" position is no longer possible, that one is always working
with inherited language, and because one inherits language, one inevitably
works within a shared framework. Now, if one seeks to question
or to displace without seeking recourse to an outside position, does one not
run the risk of conservatism?
J.D.: Well
you see, everything depends on this concept of
inherited. When you inherit a language, it does not mean you are totally in it
or you are passively programmed by it. To inherit means to be able to, of
course, appropriate this language, to transform it, to select something.
Heritage is not something you are given as a whole. It is something that calls
for interpretations, selections, reactions, response and responsibility. When
you take your responsibility as an heir, you are not simply subjected to the
heritage, you are not called to simply conserve or keep this heritage as it is,
intact. You have to make it live and survive, and that is a process - a
selective and interpretive process. So no doubt, there is a temptation simply
to repeat and to take up conservative positions. But it is not absolutely
necessary, and I would even say that in order to make something new happen, you
have to inherit, you have to be inside the language,
inside the tradition. You would not be able to transform or displace anything
without in some way being inside the tradition, without understanding the
language.
N.P.: There
is no difference without repetition...
J.D.: Of
course, of course, some repetition, some kind of repetition. But the choice is
not between repetition and innovation, but between two forms of repetition and
two forms of invention. So I think there are inventive forms of respecting the
tradition, and there are reactive or non-inventive forms. But I would not say
that in order to invent something new, or to make something new happen, you have to betray the tradition or to forget the
tradition. If I may say something about the way I try to work within the French
tradition, I have the feeling that the more I understand from within a poet or
a writer, the more I am able to, let us say reproduce what he is doing, the
more I am able to write something else, or to counter-sign. That is, to sign
another text which encounters the generic text. When I
write on authors such as Genet, I dont write like
them, I try to incorporate what they give me in order to perform something else
which bears my own signature -which is not simply mine but which is another
signature. And this happens not only in philosophy or literary theory; it
happens all the time. To speak with someone else, you have to understand what
the Other says, you have to be able to repeat it - thats what understanding means - and to be able to answer,
to respond, and your response will be different, it will be something else, and
the response includes the possibility of understanding what youre
responding to. So I would put all this in terms of response - and
responsibility -towards your heritage.
N.P.: You
have argued that language is subject to a generalized "iterability"
- that is, it can be grafted into new and unforeseen contexts...
J.D.: I have
a vague idea of the Sanskrit etymology of "itera"
which means again, the same, repetition, and something else, some alteration...
N.P.: ...so
language reproduces itself in new contexts, in new frames, and it becomes
impossible therefore to limit the range of possible meanings it thus produces.
Significantly enough, iterability suggests that one cannot
attempt to delineate the meaning of a text by referring to the intentions of
its author. This much said, is there any possibility of holding an author
responsible for the fate of his or her book? I am of course thinking of your
discussion of Nietzsche, but more generally, can a writer be held to account
for the way his or her writings are interpreted or could possibly be
interpreted? Is there any way for an author to regulate, in advance, the range
of possible interpretations?
J.D.: If you
expect an answer in the form of a "yes or no", I would say no. But if
you give me more time, I would be more hesitant. I would say that a philosopher
or writer should try of course, to be responsible for what he writes as far as
possible. For instance, one must be very careful politically, and try, not so
much to control, but to foresee all possible consequences some people might
draw from what you write. Thats
an obligation - to try to analyse and foresee everything. But its absolutely impossible. You cant control everything
because once a certain work, or a certain sentence, or a certain set of
discourses are published, when the trace is traced, it goes beyond your reach,
beyond your control, and in a different context, it can be exploited,
displaced, used beyond what you meant. And this is the question I asked about
Nietzsche since you mention him. Of course, there was an abusive interpretation
of Nietzsche by the Nazis. No doubt, Nietzsche didnt want that, it is sure. But, nevertheless, how
can we account for the fact that the only philosopher or thinker that was
referred to as a predecessor by the Nazis was Nietzsche? So there must be in Nietzsches discourse, something
which was in affinity with the Nazis, and you can say this and try to analyse
this possibility without of course, concluding that Nietzsche himself was a
Nazi, or that everything in Nietzsche was in affinity with the Nazis. But we
have to account for the fact that there was a lineage, there was some
genealogy. So, we are all exposed to this - I am sure that some people could
draw reactive or reactionary or right-wing conservative positions from what I
say. I struggle, I do my best to prevent this, but I know that I cant control it. People could take a sentence and use
it...let us take the example of what I was telling you this afternoon: of
course, I am in favour of, let us say, the development of idioms, the
differences in language so as to resist the hegemony or the monopoly of
language. But I immediately added to this statement that I was also opposed to
nationalism. That is, to the nationalistic reappropriation
of this desire for difference. Now, maybe someone can say, "well, youre in favour of divisions against a universal language,
then we would use your discourse in favour of nationalism or reactionary
linguistic violence" and so on and so forth. So, I cant
control this. I can only do my best, just adding a sentence to my first
sentence, and to go on speaking trying to neutralize the misunderstandings. But
you cant control everything, and the fact that you
cannot control everything doesn't mean simply that youre
a finite being and a limited person. It has to do with the structure of
language, the structure of the trace. As soon as you trace something, the trace
becomes independent of its source - thats
the structure of the trace. The trace becomes independent of its origin, and as
soon as the trace is traced, it escapes. You cannot control the fate of the
book totally. I cant control the future of this
interview (laughter)...You record it, but then youll
re-write it, re-frame it, build a new context, and perhaps, my sentence will
sound different. So, I trust you but I know that it is impossible to control
the publication of everything I say.
N.P.: But
there is an implicit faith, an implicit relationship...
J.D.: Its a matter of faith, of good faith, but its faith, its
faith...
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