A. Chapter I: Introduction

1. The main question clarified

2. The thesis: intellectual and moral autonomy

3. Argumentative strategy: utility vs. other defenses

B.Chapter II: Liberty of Thought and Discussion

1.Argument One: on the assumption that the opinion to be suppressed is true for all we know

2. Objections to Argument One

3. Argument Two: on the assumption that the opinion to be suppressed is false

4. Discussion of Argument Two

C.Chapter III: Individuality as a Virtue

1. The general thesis

2. Explication of individuality

3. An ambiguity: Two strains of individuality

A. Chapter I: Introduction

1. The main question clarified

The Main Question:

What are the nature and limits of the power that can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual?[p. 1]

Clarifications:

Scope = expression of opinion and actions (including plan of life) 

Society = government and, in democracies, prevailing opinion

Worry:

How, if at all, does the main question concern the family and voluntary organizations such as political parties, universities, scientific communities, professional organizations, churches, etc.? Is there a distinction between expelling someone and suppressing someone? [p. 9-10]

2. The thesis: intellectual and moral autonomy

Thesis: "The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with liberty of expression or action is to prevent harm to others." [p. 9] 

General Thrust:

Defense of intellectual and moral autonomy against authority, custom, herd-mentality, tradition, etc. [pp. 5-6] 

Cartesian-like optimism about reason, given ideal social conditions 

Cartesian-like stringent standards for reasonable beliefs [pp. 5-6]

Background Questions: The relation between intellectual virtue and truth and between moral virtue and happiness

3. Argumentative strategy: utility vs. other defenses[p. 10] 

Alternatives:

Freedom as an abstract right [from a theory of natural rights or (perhaps) natural law] 

Freedom as befitting a child of God [from Christian ethics] 

Freedom as a prerequisite for human flourishing [from some theory of the good for human beings and concomitant account of the necessary conditions for the development of moral and intellectual virtue]

Utility:

The nature of utility: Whatever is conducive to the greatest happiness of the greatest number 

Utilitariansim as a moral theory: No moral absolutes -- (How about the thesis that society should never interfere with people's freedom except to prevent harm to others??) 

Two possibilities: 

Liberty benefits everyone directly

Liberty benefits an elite directly and everyone else indirectly

B. Chapter II: Liberty of Thought and Discussion

1. Argument One: on the assumption that the opinion to be suppressed is true for all we know[pp. 16-17] 

(1) We should do all we can to ensure that we have true opinions rather than false opinions [premise] 

(2) So no authority should ever suppress an opinion which for all it knows may be true. [from (1)] 

(3) But no authority is infallible, i.e., every opinion O is such that for any authority A, O may be true for all A knows. [premise]

Therefore, no authority should ever suppress any opinion. [from (2) and (3)]

2. Objections to Argument One

Objection 1: Premise (3) is not evidently true. Christian churches, for example, claim infallibility for at least some doctrines on the basis of Sacred Scripture and/or Tradition. 

Reply: The Chinaman gambit [p. 17] 

Question: What are we to say of the following inferences? 

I accept proposition p in circumstances c, but if I had been in circumstances c* instead, I would have accepted not-p; therefore, I should not now firmly adhere to p. [Story: Chamberlain, North Dakota and deviant geometry] 

I accept p but some (many) other seemingly intelligent people accept not-p and neither side has reasons that convince the other; therefore, I should not now firmly adhere to p.

Objection 2: The inference from (1) to (2) is invalid. For some opinions are both dangerous to society and such that we have a high degree of certitude that they are false. So all that follows from (1) is: 

(2*) So no authority should ever suppress an opinion O unless O is both dangerous to society and such that we have a high degree of certitude that O is false. 

Reply: We are not entitled to any such certitude unless O is questioned constantly and left open to debate. [p. 19] 

Nagging question: Why think that this procedure of questioning is always compatible with the project of truth-seeking entailed by premise (1)? It seems that it is so compatible only on the dubious assumption that there has been uniform intellectual and moral progress through the centuries, at least in Western societies.

Objection 3: Premise (1) cannot be established by appeal to utility. There are some moral beliefs (e.g., in the inviolable dignity of each human being, and in the immorality of gratuitous harm to others and of such actions as, say, murder, rape, and child molesting) which are, even if false, beneficial to human society as a whole. 

Reply: The truth of an opinion is part of its utility!!! "In the opinion of the best men, no belief which is contrary to truth can be really useful" [p. 21]

Return of the nagging question: Is consensus a criterion for truth, even given that the consensus emerges from the sort of open debate Mill envisions?

3. Argument Two: on the assumption that the opinion to be suppressed is false [p. 33ff.] 

(1) If authority A suppresses opinion not-O, then O will be held as a dead dogma. [premise] 

(2) It is bad for any true opinion to be held as a dead dogma. [premise] 

Therefore, A should not suppress not-O

4. Discussion of Argument Two

Statement of the main objection:

There is an equivocation on the notion of a dead dogma:

Sense One: Opinion O is a dead dogma for person S = S believes O but does not have compelling arguments for O and does not know the arguments against O. [p. 35] 

Sense Two: Opinion O is a dead dogma for person S = S believes O, but S's belief in O has little or no effect on S's action or on S's life in general. [pp. 37-38] 

The objector's claim is that on sense one, premise (1) is true but premise (2) is false,

and that on sense two, premise (2) is true, but premise (1) is false.

Some questions prompted by Sense One:

Does investigating an opinion require, as a demand of intellectual virtue, a willingness to give up that opinion? 

Do we have an obligation to "follow arguments wherever they lead"? 

Does everyone have a duty--intellectual or moral--to find out all sides of every crucial question? [pp. 35 and 36-37] 

Might it ever be vicious--intellectually or morally--to raise doubts about a given opinion? 

Does accepting an opinion on authority violate intellectual responsibility? (One might compare what Mill says here with the relevant sections of Alex de Tocqueville's Democracy in America.)

Some questions about intellectual virtue:

What are the demands of intellectual virtue? 

What are the social conditions under which intellectual virtue can be fostered? 

What is the connection between intellectual virtue and truth?

C. Chapter III: Individuality as a Virtue

1. The general thesis:

Individuality is a necessary condition for human happiness or flourishing. So it should be encouraged and not suppressed

Questions:

What is individuality? 

Is this a controversial thesis?

2. Explication of individuality

1. Choosing one's own plan of life [p. 56] 
2. Possessing and developing strong impulses and creative energy [p. 57] 
3. Being willing to go against and rise above the "mass of mediocrity" [pp. 58-59] 
4. Not being motivated by authority, even the authority of God [p. 59] 
5. Being original and creative ..... the creative genius as an ideal of human flourishing [p. 62]

• 3. An ambiguity: Two strains of individuality 

Strain One: Individuality entails a rejection of (or at least a deep suspicion of) any claim to moral and intellectual authority. [p. 59] ........ The creative genius vs. the saint. 

Strain Two: Individuality entails only a willingness to resist common opinion as an agent of mediocrity. [p. 63] ........ This dovetails with, and does not conflict with, De Tocqueville's own worry about the simultaneously anarchic and repressive aspect of democratic regimes. And yet the two authors are miles apart in their views on moral and epistemic authority.